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The reviewers of The Creative Mind (henceforth KM) have raised a host of 
interesting points. Most fall into seven groups: the definition of creativity; the 
distinction between H-creativity and P-creativity; the role of the social context; 
the role of evaluation; the four Lovelace questions; specific computational 
mechanisms used for modelling creativity; AI-models as aids to creativity; and the 
treatment of music in TCM. I shall group my replies accordingly. 
1. Definition of creativity 
Most of the reviewers point out, quite rightly, that my definition of creativity in 
TCM was vague. To some extent, this was unavoidable: the notion of positive 
value or interest, which is essential to the concept of creativity, cannot be given 
any general definition and is open to considerable disagreement in individual 
cases. But I should have been clearer about the differences between what I called 
“combinational”, “exploratory”, and “transformational” creativity. 
For instance, I did not make it sufficiently clear (despite my examples of 
Dickens in Chapter 3 and Mozart in Chapter 10) that mere exploration of 
conceptual spaces is often, and understandably, counted as creative. Exploration 
of a space (conceptual or terrestrial) can sometimes show us regions that were 
previously unsuspected, and boundaries lying in surprising places. In short, it can 
offer surprises comparable to the surprises provided by transformational creativi- 
ty. Not all exploration does this, of course. But even simple induction-which, as 
Roger Schank points out, is the antithesis of transformational creativity+an 
explore a space with sometimes surprising (and valuable) results (TCM, Chapter 
8). Most current AI-programs explore rather than transform their conceptual 
spaces, but even so they may come up with apparently creative surprises. As 
David Perkins remarks, however, the term applies in its richest sense with the 
creative process involves changing the rules, not just working within them. 
Also, I often used the distinction between a (superficial) tweaking and a 
(fundamental) transformation in a way that was intuitive rather than analytic. 
0004-3702/95/$09.50 0 1995 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDZ 0004-3702(95)00074-7 
Thus I described Kekule’s move from string-molecules to ring-molecules as a 
change that transformed the relevant conceptual space more fundamentally than 
the (later) move to rings comprising five atoms. not all of which need be carbon. 
A chemist specializing in aromatic compounds might see things differently, taking 
ring-molecules for granted and seeing the basic gulf as lying between (for 
instance) benzene and pyridine. In general. it would not always be easy to 
“place” specific AI-processes. such as Schank’s heuristics for tweaking explana- 
tion patterns, within my scheme. Distinguishing tweaking from transformation is 
not straightforward, since it depends not only on defining the dimensions of 
conceptual spaces but also on individuating them. Because of the hierarchically 
structured nature of many such spaces, this is not a cut-and-dried matter, but 
requires us to distinguish styles within styles. 
In Chapter 4, for example, I described post-Renaissance Western music as a 
single conceptual space, which took several centuries to explore and which was 
eventually transformed by the move into atonal music. But this space undeniably 
consists of a number of sub-spaces (baroque music, jazz) and sub-sub-spaces 
(Bach. Vivaldi). Likewise. a scientific space (such as chemistry) will usually 
contain many theories or hypotheses, only some of which are linked in a clear 
hierarchical fashion. The difficulty of judging the boundaries of distinct con- 
ceptual spaces is highlighted by work in the history of art and science, yet such 
work is itself necessary to help us judge the creativity (both the novelty and the 
interest) of the ideas under consideration. This difficulty of definition bedevils all 
those who discuss creativity in general. including AI-workers who seek to model 
it. 
1 plead guilty, then. to the complaint that my definition of creativity was 
problematic. However. I do not accept Scott Turner’s charge that I lay too much 
stress on the hypothesis of representational redescription, or RR (TCM, Chapter 
4). I do not claim that it is the sole factor underlying creativity, rather that it is a 
precondition for the construction, exploration, and transformation of conceptual 
spaces. In a recent publication Karmiloff-Smith herself says as much, and claims 
that animals lack creativity because they lack RR [13]. Nor do I claim that RR 
happens only in children (I cite relevant evidence in adults learning to read, or 
play the piano). But the point is that it appears to happen in all children, and it 
appears to be essential if the child is to be flexible and imaginative in his/her 
skilled behaviour. Self-mapping of conceptual spaces is necessary for creativity in 
general: as Kenneth Haase remarks, if we form and follow a map of the 
bead-game, our explorations will be more fruitful than if we played the game 
without it. 
Turner says that creativity is not due to a “singular” process of conceptual 
restructuring, but to conscious, incremental problem-solving processes. That is 
often true. The types of example Turner has in mind presumably include the 
scientific problem-solving modelled by Herb Simon and his colleagues [14]. But 
Grandpa’s jokes? And Coleridge’s imagery? These are not generated by con- 
scious problem-solving processes. I agree with Turner that they, and creative 
ideas in general, are produced by normal everyday processes: that is what 
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Chapter 10 (and much of Chapters 5 and 6) is about. In my account, conceptual 
restructuring is not a question of a sudden Gestalt-switch, but a focussed 
(sometimes conscious) change in one or more dimensions of the pre-existing 
structure. So KekulC, for instance, did not “discard” his previous space: on the 
contrary, he transformed it into another, closely related, one. As I argue in TCM, 
if we were to discard our conceptual spaces whenever thinking something new, 
the novel thoughts would be unintelligible-so would be neither valued nor 
preserved. 
This leads me to hesitate also over Haase’s description of a radical conceptual 
change as one which throws out the lines and landmarks of the previous map and 
replaces them with new ones. This may be very largely true, but some aspects of 
the previous space need to be retained if we are to orient ourselves intelligibly. 
(Some aspects may be “retained” even in being dropped or negated: the obvious 
absence of an expected dimension can act as a reminder of it.) 
Turner says that my definition of creativity lays me open to the devil of 
determinism. But he does not refer to Chapter 9, which was wholly addressed to 
this problem. And he and Ashwin Ram (and colleagues) complain that my 
definition of transformational creativity in terms of apparently impossible ideas 
leads to inconsistency. However, I explain in TCM (Chapter 1) that to say that 
someone “could not” have produced the idea before can be sensibly asserted only 
by reference to a specific conceptual space. If we try to apply this notion to the 
entire resources of the person’s mind (or the computer’s program), of course we 
get an inconsistency. 
The same applies to computer programs. A program which uses (for example) 
genetic algorithms, or AM’s concept-transforming heuristics [15], is changing its 
space in significant ways. It could not do so without the algorithms provided by 
the programmer; but that is just to say that computers-like people-need a set 
of general computational processes besides the domain-specific spaces that they 
deal with, to which we must implicitly refer when we speak of creativity. One 
might want to argue that some of these processes are domain-specific, so should 
be counted as lying within the conceptual space itself. This recalls Schank’s 
comment that the distinction between rules and meta-rules is highly problematic. 
Schank sees my definition as implying that creativity is a matter of degree. I am 
very happy with that, if it means that creativity is not an all or none matter. But, 
as explained in Section 4 (below), I prefer to say that creativity is multi- 
dimensional-which in turn means that the relevant dimensions need to be 
specified in any argument about the “degree” of creativity of a given idea. For the 
same reasons, I agree with Haase that the single distinction “creative” is too 
coarse to describe the inter-representational relations involved in complex 
generative systems. 
Ram’s complaint that my definition of creativity presupposes a particular 
computational account of mental life is perhaps prompted by the fact that I did 
not sufficiently stress either exploratory or combinational creativity. In fact, I 
assume that many different types of process, and many different types of 
representation, are involved. And Ram’s comment that new methods of inference 
and control (such as those used for case-based reasoning) can also lead to creative 
novelty is well-taken. It is difficult enough to enable computer programs to 
change their representations. At present, most cannot do so: they explore, rather 
than transform, their conceptual spaces. My hunch is that it will be even more 
difficult to enable them to come up with novel-and fruitful-forms of inference 
and control. But note the term “enabling” here: Ram rightly notes that 
constraints (in minds or programs) limit what structures can be generated-but 
they enable generation, too. They are not mere prohibitions, but positive 
guidelines. 
Whereas my definition concentrated on creative ideas (leading me to ask how a 
single novel structure could have originated from the conceptual resources already 
present), Perkins broadens the discussions to creative systems-which I see as 
covering several related ideas and conceptual spaces. 1 found much of interest in 
his review, not least the notion of “adaptive” novelties gradually changing a 
conceptual system. The biological metaphor of adaptation fits many examples 
(Schank’s work on goals and explanation, for instance). But the criteria of 
“fitness” may suddenly alter. Especially in the arts, the values (selection 
pressures) may shift unpredictably to very different ones, because the system’s 
environment contains other people, whose judgments-and even whims-may 
influence what counts as adaptive (see Section 4, below). 
Perkins reminds us that striking novelty may emerge from mundane underpin- 
nings. He compares psychological creativity with the emergence of adaptive 
novelty from blind biological and social processes. Many examples of the 
emergence of complexity from simple processes are being modelled by work in 
artificial life (Perkins mentions the Tierra system, for instance [20]), which- 
despite emphatic denials by some members of the A-life community--overlaps AI 
in various ways [5]. In TCM I cited Howard Gruber’s [S] study of the 
development of Darwin’s ideas over many decades, but did not sufficiently stress 
the gradualness of this development. As Perkins says, we should consider the slow 
growth of novel ideas, as well as sudden insights and deliberate (conscious) 
problem-solving. This requires not just subtle psychologizing, but also careful 
historical work, like Gruber’s. 
Further helpful remarks from Perkins concern how to describe the inherent 
difficulty of a given search space. The search spaces of interest, he points out, 
must be complexly structured, otherwise simple search and hill-climbing would 
suffice. What sorts of difficulty inhibit us from moving to new, and fruitful, 
locations within the space. and how can they be best overcome? Perkins’ 
discussion of the rarity. isolation, oasis, and plateau problems are highly 
suggestive. I see them as related to Haase’s intriguing questions about the 
“thickness” of interesting results within a space. Some measure of the likelihood 
that a system will be “struck”. or “liberated”, on certain dimensions or at certain 
points would be very helpful in understanding creative systems. Possibly, AI- 
modellers might adapt some of the techniques used in A-life to model fitness 
landscapes. They would also need to define (domain-general? domain-specific?) 
heuristics for overcoming the four problems identified by Perkins. 
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Perkins objects that my definition of creativity does not include evolution, 
because evolution does not change the rules. It is true that the most general rules, 
variation and natural selection, remain unchanged. (Likewise, the basic GAS in 
an evolutionary program remain unchanged). But evolution clearly changes the 
space, altering the constraints influencing the potential variation and selection at 
any given stage. There is a difference between the mutations and recombinations 
that can arise, and the results that can survive, from a bat-genome and a 
fish-genome. In a highly abstract sense, both bats and fish were within the 
possibility-space of biological evolution right from the beginning. But their 
emergence became less improbable as their evolutionary precursors appeared. 
Similarly, the general resources of the human mind include the possibility of 
painting “Guernica” and writing “Hamlet’‘-but one had better learn something 
about paint, war, guilt, and indecisiveness if one wishes to do either of these 
things. In other words, taxonomic and morphological categories in biology are 
comparable to conceptual spaces (as Perkins himself suggests). 
2. H-creativity and P-creativity 
The distinction between H-creativity and P-creativity is taken up by several 
reviewers, sometimes in a way that obscures the fact that “H” implies “P”. For 
example, Ram says that H-creativity “typically” results from P-creativity, which 
implies that occasionally it does not. However, since H-creativity is defined in 
terms of P-creativity (KM, p, 32), H-creative ideas are a sub-class of P-creative 
ones. Similarly, Ram says that “most examples of H-creativity must in the end be 
explained in terms of some individual’s P-creative act”. For “most”, read “all”: 
here, too, we have a necessary truth. 
This is not to deny (what is mentioned in TCM, Chapter 3) that the individual’s 
H-new idea may be dependent in various ways on the closely-related ideas of 
other individuals in his/her reference group. In AI-modelling to date, such 
influences have been ignored (it is difficult enough to model what’s going on 
within a single mind). They are not precluded in principle: AI-models of 
cooperation, or distributed knowledge-bases, might contribute to our understand- 
ing of creativity. Even so, insofar as our question is the psychological query “How 
did the idea arise?“, the answer can only be in terms of individual minds, 
functioning in varying degrees of independence. 
Both RAM and Schank suggest hat the best research strategy in AI-modelling 
is to focus on the everyday psychological processes underlying P-creativity. 
Analogy, for example, is highlighted by Ram as a wide-ranging phenomenon 
which contributes significantly to creative thinking, and Schank shows that 
reminding (TCM, p. 241) is a source of novel ideas too. I agree. Indeed, this was 
the central theme of Chapter 10 on “Elite or Everyman?“. Perkins’ psychological 
experiments cited in that chapter provide illustrations of the role of everyday 
processes in creativity. Not surprisingly, his experimental subjects did not come 
166 M.A. Boden ! Artificial Intelltgencc~ 79 (199.5) 161-182 
up with any ideas that will go into the history books: experimental studies, barring 
extraordinary coincidences, are confined to P-creativity. 
It does not follow, as Schank seems to believe, that AI-modellers should ignore 
examples of H-creativity. Schank claims that an understanding of creativity will 
come from modelling normal P-creative insights, rather than from providing 
rational reconstructions of scientific breakthroughs, as Simon’s group do (Chapter 
8 of TCM; [14]). L‘k 1 ewise, he complains that I forget my own P/H distinction, in 
mentioning many H-creative cases (as well as more mundane instances) through- 
out the book. But H-creative examples are necessarily P-creative too. Moreover, 
they are intriguing to AI-researchers and psychologists, as also to the general 
reader. To attempt to model, or write a book about. creativity without addressing 
any examples of H-creativity would not be persuasive. Where Schank (like Ram) 
is correct is in saying that, in modelling the mechanisms of creativity, we should 
focus first on everyday psychological processes shared by us all. 
If this (in conjunction with the input of the “historical” data) results in a 
convincing rational reconstruction of famous H-historical cases. so much the 
better. But in the first instance. at least. that is not necessary. As Seymour Papert 
remarked years ago, AI should avoid the superhuman human fallacy: if one 
cannot model Newton or Shakespeare. it does not follow that one cannot model 
significant aspects of the minds of lesser mortals. 
Questions about the “how” of H-creativity primarily concern individual minds, 
as we have seen. But if our question is historical-sociological: “Why was the idea 
greatly valued after it had arisen. 7” then social factors are not only relevant, but 
predominant. Moreover, these are not systematic, but highly contingent. That is 
why, as stressed in TCM. we cannot hope for any systematic explanation of 
H-creativity-whether psychological, sociological, or historical. There are three 
reasons for this: many non-psychological facts are relevant, not all of which can in 
practice be discovered; these facts are not all of the same type, so do not fall 
under any unifying theory; and the values used to ascribe the honorific “creative” 
to novel ideas differ across societies. and change unpredictably within social 
groups. 
This does not mean that psychologists who study H-creativity are wasting their 
time. Many studies, most recently those of Howard Gardner [7], have found 
evidence that certain motivational and personality factors are typical of H- 
creators. To put it bluntly, most H-creators are so determined (not to say 
obstinate) and self-directed (not to say selfish) that they exploit, and often 
damage, those closest to them in highly unfortunate ways. As remarked in TCM 
(Chapter lo), motivation and self-confidence have at least as much to do with 
someone’s ability to H-create as cognitive factors do. 
Perkins stresses the importance of psychodynamics, which cognitive science has 
largely ignored. To be sure. the question of how it was possible for a specific 
creative idea to arise in someone’s mind is distinct from the question of what 
motivated the person in coming up with it-and sticking to it. It is thus reasonable 
for a cognitive psychologist to decide to focus on the first question rather than the 
second. But, as Perkins reminds us, the second requires attention also. (Compu- 
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tational theories of motivation are still thin on the ground. The most interesting, I
think, is that developed by Aaron Sloman and Luc Beaudoin [l, 24]-but even 
this theory cannot significantly enrich our commonsense intuition that H-creativity 
depends on strong motivation.) 
We also need to answer Perkins’ question as to why some people (Turing, for 
example) seem to H-create repeatedly over many years. As I remarked in TCM 
(p. 36), a P-creative idea which misses being H-creative only by some historical 
accident (missing the priority by a few weeks or months) is very good grounds for 
a “bet” that the person concerned will come up with H-creative ideas later. 
(Roger Lustig’s comment that “Turing’s work [for the award of his Fellowship] 
was H-creative for all practical purposes” thus merely restates my point.) 
However, just what it is which enables someone to H-create over and over again 
is highly obscure. 
Ram suggests that in such individuals the usual search space may be interesting- 
ly different or expanded, so enabling creative thought using the very same 
mechanisms that usually generate more mundane ideas. This is intuitively 
plausible. Perhaps the difference is partly a matter of extra constraints being 
developed within the widely-known constraints: such additional distinctions would 
allow for additional possibilities in exploring, and transforming, them. And 
perhaps this is a large part of what is going on when, as we say, the creator is 
spending years “acquiring domain expertise”-for expertise is necessary, though 
not sufficient, for constant creativity. (One example might be the musical “rules” 
characteristic of certain areas of Bach’s music mentioned in TCM, Chapter 5.) 
As for P-creativity in general, there is considerable psychometric (and even 
some neurophysiological) evidence suggesting that specific ways of using and 
generalizing concepts are characteristic of creative individuals [6]. But studies of 
motivation, personality, and conceptualization can only take us so far: they can 
tell us nothing about why certain people, at certain times and places, decided that 
an H-novel idea was not only novel but also valuable. 
Because of the unclarities involved in identifying H-creative ideas, Haase 
suggests that we replace the binary P/H distinction with several analogues, 
varying with the size of the community over which the novelty is defined. This is a 
helpful suggestion, which can contribute to our psychological as well as our 
historical understanding. Detailed historical studies can sometimes distinguish 
distinct groups and sub-groups within what to the undiscriminating eye looks like 
one scientific community (see [22] and Section 3 below). 
An interesting example of a potentially creative “community” suggested by 
Haase is the human-computer duo. As Haase points out, AM’s apparent 
creativity is dependent on human judgment in various ways. Not only did Doug 
Lenat, in writing the program, insert the generative and evaluative heuristics he 
expected to be most fruitful, but he frequently influenced AM’s ongoing 
performance by “naming” some of its novel structures, thus leading the program 
to focus on them rather than others. Lenat reports that AM (and even 
EURISKO) have come up with a few valuable H-creative ideas (minor theorems 
about maximally divisible numbers, for example). But-at least in the present 
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state of the art-the more the human “partner” is involved, the more this is likely 
to happen. Programmed “agents” could help human creators in various ways, 
sometimes leading to the generation of ideas that would probably not have arisen 
from either human(s) or computer alone [4]. 
Haase focusses on the embedding of creativity in various social contexts, and on 
motion across the boundaries between different spheres of novelty. I agree with 
his conclusion (arrived at by some other reviewers also) that we need far more 
words than “creative” and “novel”, to describe innovations in such a complex 
social-conceptual space. To arrive at a more powerful and discriminating vocabul- 
ary for describing creative change, we shall need to study a wide range of 
examples drawn from different conceptual spaces, each mapped (defined) in 
detail. It is an open question to what extent the same vocabulary will apply to all 
cases, but my bet would be that significantly different distinctions will need to be 
drawn in differing domains. 
3. Social context 
Several reviewers stress the importance of the social context-not only in the 
crucial evaluation phase. which decides whether the new idea is accepted and 
promulgated, but also in the generation phase itself. Ram, for instance, makes the 
important point that innovation often arises when ideas from one culture are 
applied in another. There are many historical examples of outbursts of creativity 
when new cultural groups (such as traders or refugees) come into a settled society. 
The generative importance of the social context is also evident if we consider 
peer-groups of expert individuals. Ram mentions, as examples, Maxwell’s 
location in Cambridge and Faraday’s links with continental physicists. A superb 
essay on the role of such social contexts in both the generation and the evaluation 
of creative ideas is Simon Schaffer’s “Making Up Discovery” [22]. Schaffer shows 
that the social construction of a scientific “discovery”, even of something as 
apparently unproblematic as the discovery of dinosaurs, may take years of 
theoretically informed (and nationalistically biassed) negotiation within the 
relevant scientific community. 
Ram points out that some social factors can be figured into the account without 
our being required to produce a computational model of culture. For instance, to 
produce computer modelling equivalents of the injection of unfamiliar ideas from 
other cultures would require us to enlarge the data-base by adding a different 
conceptual space, or additional entries to the semantic network available to a 
connectionist system. But, for this to be fruitful, the generative processes already 
available to the model would have to be powerful (general) enough to be able to 
work on these newly-added structures as well as the “native” structures already 
provided. The more different the cultures in question, the more difficult this 
would be. 
The simulation of the sorts of peer-group negotiation described by Schaffer 
would however be more difficult. It involves not only the cooperative interchange 
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of ideas to aid generation and modification of the nascent scientific discovery in 
question, but also the cooperative-and, to some degree, competitive-evaluation 
of the ideas that result. The role of evaluation is currently underplayed in 
AI-models of creativity, often being left implicit rather than made explicit as a 
separate process within the model. To simulate the social agreements on 
evaluation that are so important in human creativity is, as yet, beyond the state of 
the art. So too is the phenomenon, also mentioned by Ram, of someone’s taking 
a very long time to develop a creative idea. Ram mentions Maxwell’s taking nine 
months to develop the notion of electrostatic action, and one might add Darwin’s 
idea of evolution by natural selection, which took almost a lifetime to mature [g]. 
4. Evaluation 
The problem of evaluation in assessing-and modelling-creativity is put in a 
nutshell by Ram, who remarks that the distinction between an idea’s being novel 
and its being interestingly novel is problematic. 
As suggested in Section 3 above (and in Chapter 3 of KM), evaluation is a 
social matter that can be affected by all sorts of intellectually extraneous factors, 
such as nationality, fashion, rivalry, and commercialism. This fact is well 
illustrated by Gary Taylor’s [25] scholarly work on “the Shakespeare industry”, 
cited in TCM (p. 34), and also by Schaffer’s work on scientific discovery, 
mentioned above. 
One may, of course, recognize the strong social determinants of evaluation 
while also adopting certain evaluative criteria oneself. That is, one does not 
necessarily have to accept relativism in agreeing that “creative” is, to a large 
extent, a socially bestowed honorific. (I am therefore puzzled by Lustig’s 
complaint that I insulted Taylor by calling him a relativist. I did not use the term 
relativist as an insult, nor name Taylor as a relativist. I deliberately spoke of “the 
relativist” in general, in pointing out that relativist critics of literature or science 
cannot use the term “creative” in its usual sense, because they accept only 
descriptive, not evaluative, differences between scientific theories, or works of 
art.) 
Another difficulty identified by Ram lies in the fact that (as argued at length in 
Chapter 10 of TCM) the psychological processes responsible for creative thinking 
are not unique to special individuals, but are possessed by us all. It is therefore 
unclear how to distinguish those thoughts which are creative from those which are 
not-in a given individual, irrespective of past history. In other words, even 
assessing the degree of P-creativity is problematic. 
This is largely correct. But I prefer to avoid speaking of the “degree” of 
creativity, since to do so implies a continuous spectrum along which individual 
thoughts are to be ordered. To the contrary, a main theme of TCM is that 
creativity is multi-dimensional. Some relevant dimensions are easily conceived of 
as continuous, others are not: certain structures simply cannot be generated from 
particular (untransformed) conceptual spaces, for instance. But even if all the 
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dimensions were continuous. they are to a large extent orthogonal. Ideally, 
therefore, one should gloss attributions of creativity in terms of the specific 
respect (or respects) in which the thought is creative. This would involve detailed 
comparisons that would place the putative novelty, relative to a variety of other 
ideas. Unless one is in the business of handing out Nobel prizes or the like, it does 
not matter if one cannot decide which of two ideas is “more” creative. Indeed, it 
may be misleading (as well as socially unproductive) to make the attempt. 
Haase argues that the real work facing AI-modellers (and psychologists) of 
creativity lies in thinking carefully about the boundaries and interactions of 
conceptual spaces, and requires terms more precise (and less loaded) than 
“creative” or “novel”. I fully agree that we need a more precise terminology, and 
many detailed investigations of specific examples. I cannot agree, however, if by 
“less loaded” Haase means “non-evaluative”. As I argued in Chapter 3 of TCM, 
positive evaluation is an essential aspect of our concept of creativity, and as such 
is unavoidable in any reference to or study of it. If we were to study merely the 
generation of new ideas (granting that “new”, also, can be problematic), we 
would not be studying creativity, as this term is normally understood. Moreover, 
we should still require evaluative criteria (of mathematical interestingness, for 
example [15]) to sort out the wheat from the chaff-an evaluative distinction, if 
ever there was one. 
This is not to deny that. as Schank remarks, more discussion concerning the 
criterion of value would have been helpful in TCM. There are, as he says, many 
kinds of value. His list of values focusses on explanatory creativity (in everyday 
life, as well as in science), and he says that we need a richly detailed theory of the 
kinds of goals and evaluative criteria that may inform this type of creativity. I 
have no quarrel with that. But there are other kinds of creativity, which have 
nothing to do with explanation, or even with “reminding”. A musician composing 
a sonata, or improvising a jazz-blues, is doing something which Schank’s account 
does not cover. 
Also, we need to remember that the “goal”, even assuming that one can 
sensibly identify one, typically becomes more well-specified as the creative 
thinking proceeds, largely as a result of a dialectic interaction with the successive 
stages of thought. Lenat’s AM (which, by the way, is not a model of explanatory 
creativity) attempts to model this feedback-led specification to some extent, but 
AI-modelling is not yet adequate to capture the subtleties of this important aspect 
of human creativity (well described in informal terms in 191). 
To cap it all, we have to remember that evaluation can vary with time and 
place. Any AI-model able to recognize creativity in its own and others’ ideas 
(thus satisfying the third Lovelace question) would unavoidably be using evalua- 
tive criteria open to change and challenge of unpredictable kinds. It could be 
accepted by people as a satisfactory model of creativity-r even as a useful tool 
for coming up with creative ideas+nly to the extent that the people concerned 
shared the same values within the domain concerned. 
Haase’s reminders of the cases of Mendel and McClintock are apt. The interest 
in these cases lies not only in how the new ideas arose, but in why (as we now 
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judge) they were not recognized for many years as being valuable. The answers 
are complex, involving not only the expected resistance to maverick scientific 
concepts but also (for example) lack of publication in widely-accessible journals, 
and prejudice against women. In this context, Haase mentions the “possible 
injustice [which] resonates powerfully with our own most basic experiences of not 
being understood”. This remark reminds us of the exceptionally strong motivation 
that must drive H-creators-partly to acquire the necessary expertise, and partly 
to persist in their own evaluation of their maverick ideas. 
As Schank reminds us, the person who encounters someone else’s creative idea 
may evaluate it largely because they have already “internalized” the conceptual 
spaces and evaluative criteria of the creator. In the haiku-program described in 
TCM (Chapter 7), for instance, the “meaning” is provided by the interpretative 
skills of the human reader, not the (non-existent) semantic powers of the 
automatic writer. This is partly why the third Lovelace question is relevant to the 
topic of computer creativity. To interpret sensibly, and to value acceptably, both 
require complex cognitive capacities. 
The impossibility of a scientific theory of evaluation in general (because values 
can change for unpredictable, and sometimes seemingly perverse, reasons) does 
not rule out the possibility that some values may be very common, or even 
universal. Criteria of symmetry and simplicity, for example, are commonly used 
in the valuation of works of art or scientific theories. To be sure, some degree of 
asymmetry and disorder are often welcomed (think of Robert Herrick’s poem on 
“A sweet disorder in the dress . . .” ), and baroque complexity may be preferred 
over classical order. But that symmetry and simplicity are so often judged to be 
relevant may be grounded in very general facts about human information 
processing. Similarly, some people argue for the “biophilia hypothesis”, claiming 
that humans share universal aesthetic preferences grounded in our evolutionary 
ancestry: for instance, certain types of landscape, and even tree-shape, appear to 
be favoured by people from vastly different societies, living in vastly different 
terrains [lo]. Identification of shared evaluative biasses, however, is hampered by 
the fact that these are only tendencies-which may be swamped by strong cultural 
influences. In other words, even if they exist at all they are not strong enough to 
make us insist that they should be included as a matter of course in AI-models of 
human creativity. 
5. The four Lovelace questions 
The four Lovelace questions itemized in Chapter 1 are: 
LQ-1. Can computational concepts and models help us to understand human 
creativity? 
LQ-2. Could a computer at least appear to be creative, its performance being 
comparable to human creativity? 
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LQ-3. Could a computer appear to recognize creativity (in its own ideas, or those 
of other systems)? 
LQ-4. Could a computer be “really” creative (as opposed to merely producing 
apparently creative performance whose originality is wholly due to the pro- 
grammer)? 
I am therefore bemused by Turner’s claim that I do not address “the question 
of whether computers can be creative”. The last three of the four Lovelace 
questions address this issue, and LQ-2 and LQ-3 are discussed throughout the 
book. As for LQ-4, this is discussed at length in Chapter 11. I “sideline” it in the 
preceding chapters because, as a philosophical rather than a scientific question, it 
lies outside the main issue (LO-1 ): whether the concepts and processes underlying 
apparent-creativity in computer models can help psychologists to formulate 
helpful theories about human creativity. 
A further reason for delaying consideration of LQ-4 until the final chapter was 
that it is an extremely complex question, involving at least four types of 
philosophical argument. As outlined in Chapter 11 of TCM, these arguments 
concern brain-stuff. consciousness, semantically empty programs, and the practi- 
cal implications of human community. Each of these arguments is controversial, 
and they are to a large degree independent of each other. Turner seems to 
confuse them, in claiming that if one accepts the naturalist view of “mind as 
computer”, and if computers cannot in theory be creative, then the human mind 
must be more than just a physical mechanism. 
Functionalism--or “mind as computer program, brain as computer”-is just 
one of many naturalist views of the mind/brain. and is philosophically contro- 
versial. Many people argue, for example, that consciousness cannot be captured 
in functionalist. or computational, terms. In TCM (pp. 278-281) I argue that 
although this may perhaps be true. it is not enough to render computational 
theories of human psychology, including creativity, irrelevant. The “perhaps” is 
needed here not merely because of our neuroscientific ignorance, but primarily 
because we do not yet sufficiently understand the concept of consciousness at the 
philosophical level. In view of this unclarity, we cannot be sure that if computers 
cannot be conscious (and if consciousness is necessary for creativity) then the 
human mind/ brain must be partly supra-physical. 
Some naturalist views of mind/brain do not accept “mind as computer 
program”. To take just one example. well-known to the AI-community: the 
philosopher John Searle [29] sees the mind as a natural product of the brain, and 
claims that the (as-yet unknown) properties of brain-stuff which underlie mental 
processes are not possessed by metal and silicon. I show in Chapter 11 (pp. 
271-273) that Searle offers no argument for this empirical hypothesis (which may 
conceivably be true), and that his associated claim-that it is intuitively obvious 
that neuroprotein can support mentality. whereas metal and silicon cannot-is 
certainly false. However, neither Searle nor I wish to claim that the brain is more 
than just a physical mechanism. Moreover. Searle explicitly allows that some 
M.A. Boden I Artificial Intelligence 79 (1995) 161-182 173 
computer could, in principle, produce performance precisely the same as the 
behaviour of people. This covers all cases of human creativity, including 
Shakespeare and Beethoven. Whether Turner would take this to be an argument 
“for” or “against” computers being creative is unclear, as he does not distinguish 
the four Lovelace questions. 
The fourth type of philosophical argument against regarding computers as 
creative (TCM, pp. 281-284) has nothing to do with whether or not the mind/ 
brain is “more than just a physical mechanism”. Rather, it concerns an essentially 
moral-political decision about whether to accord moral and epistemological status 
to computers, as we all do to other human beings (though Nazis did not do to 
Jews, nor slave-owners to slaves), and as some humans do also to some animals. 
Just as the case for treating animals with respect or compassion does not depend 
on, or imply, the view that animals are more than physical mechanisms, so the 
decision to accord some moral or epistemological status to computers would not 
imply this either. Conversely, someone who refuses to regard computers as 
creative, so as to avoid certain practical (moral) implications, is not thereby 
claiming that human brains are not purely physical mechanisms. 
Whereas Turner accuses me of ignoring the question whether computers can be 
creative (let us assume he means “really” creative, as in LQ-4), Schank complains 
that I have wasted too much space on it. He says the question has no practical 
importance “unless in a philosophy class”. Science-fictional scenarios apart, I 
agree. This is why, as explained above, I postponed LQ-4 until the final chapter. 
But it does not follow that it should not be discussed at all. Quite apart from its 
intrinsic interest (and the regularity with which it is raised by people outside AI), 
LQ-4 needs to be discussed in order to demonstrate its difference from the first 
three Lovelace questions. In my experience, even AI-professionals sometimes 
confuse it with the others. 
Schank himself seems to assume that, because the evaluative aspect of 
attributions of creativity is inescapably subjective (there being no “acid test” for 
creativity), no answer to LQ-4 can be given. But the evaluation of creativity is 
irrelevant to some philosophical arguments about it (such as the “non-human” 
argument, TCM, pp. 281-284). In resisting Schank’s dismissal of LQ-4, I am not 
saying that I agree with Searle (whose views Schank rejects). In Chapter 11 of 
TCM I make it clear that I do not. The point, here, is that LQ-4, and Schank’s 
claims relating to it, require philosophical consideration. 
I agree with Schank that people do not always fully understand each other, so 
that to insist on perfect understanding in an AI-model is unfair. I agree, too, that 
(as noted on page 278 of TCM) understanding is not an all-or-none matter. But it 
does not follow that a purely behavioural criterion of understanding is acceptable. 
Schank tells us that his educational programs are felt by the students to 
understand their questions to some degree. He concludes that his programs 
clearly do embody a degree of understanding. This does not follow. His students 
could be wrong, in two different ways. 
First, they may mistakenly attribute capacities to the user-friendly system which 
it does not, in fact, possess (but which some more advanced program might 
possess). Early mistakes of this kind with respect to ELIZA were legion, and I 
have argued elsewhere [2, pp. 463-472 and 496-4971 that user-friendliness should 
not be overdone, lest this sort of over-trusting attitude be uncritically adopted by 
non-specialist human users. 
Second, Schank ignores all the philosophical controversy concerning the Turing 
Test. This (thankfully) is not the place to rehearse these arguments. But it must 
be said that most philosophers (myself included) do not accept the Turing Test as 
an adequate criterion of understanding. We would be mistaken, for example, in 
attributing understanding to a computer whose passing the Turing Test was due to 
a giant look-up table, as opposed to a set of systematic and interacting generative 
processes. (Similarly, a novel notion unconnected in any way with the domain in 
question could not properly be termed a ‘*creative ” contribution to that domain- 
even if, as a matter of fact, it prompted someone else to see the connections.) The 
fact that Schank’s students can be “fooled” into believing that his program 
understands them is therefore irrelevant. 
Schank might counter this argument by pointing to his claim that AI-models of 
thinking (understanding, creativity) need not fit our intuitions about how humans 
achieve these things. Up to a point. I agree: some of our intuitions may be wrong; 
and in any event, Martians (and computers) might be different. But that is not to 
say that the internal mechanisms are wholly irrelevant. One example showing 
they are not is the giant look-up table. mentioned above. Another is the 
geometry-program discussed in TCM (pp. 104-l lo), and mentioned by several 
reviewers. This program is not creative in proving the “base-angles equal” 
theorem, because its method involves no transformation of the conceptual space 
of geometry (nor any analogue of the visual understanding of 2D- and 3D-space 
possessed by Euclid and Pappus). 
In his final paragraph. Schank says ‘the right question isn’t whether a 
mechanistic explanation of creativity is possible. it’s how”. But “the right 
question” for whom‘? My book was aimed not only at AI-workers and sympathiz- 
ers, such as computational psychologists, but at the far wider audience of people 
who are convinced that computer models must be utterly irrelevant to the 
psychological understanding of human creativity. That is. I was not preaching 
only to the converted. I therefore had to argue for controversial philosophical 
positions which many AI-researchers take for granted. perhaps without realizing 
that they are doing so. 
When Schank says “If progress is to be made in modeling human capabilities 
such as creativity, the focus must be on research strategies in AI, not on 
philosophical discussions”, 1 agree with him-provided he means “the main 
focus”. That is why Chapters 5-8 of TCM focus specifically on AI work, and why 
Chapters l-4 offer definitions and examples to be used as background for 
considering the relevant AI-research. But the philosophical discussion in Chapters 
9 and 11 is necessary too. (One point made in Chapter 9 is that, contra Schank, 
science does not consist only in finding predictive “laws of nature”: it seeks to 
make natural phenomena intelligible. by showing how they are possible, how they 
are structured, and how they are related.) 
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6. Specific computational mechanisms 
Many examples of computational mechanisms are mentioned in the reviews, 
and in TCM itself. Here, I shall focus on just a few. 
One promising example is case-based reasoning, discussed in Ram’s review 
(and used by Turner in his work on story-generation). I see this work as lying 
within the tradition of heuristic problem-solving described by George Polya [19]. 
Ram focusses on how we can-and how AI-models might be able to-analyze and 
reformulate problems, and how we can adapt old solutions to new problems. This 
adaptation may require us to combine past solutions or experiences, which in turn 
demands powerful methods of storage and access. 
To illustrate the subtle problems facing us here, let me give an example. Some 
years ago, I was marking a pile of philosophy dissertations. Several were on a 
highly abstract, and much-discussed, philosophical topic: the nature of representa- 
tion. The essays stated the problem, defined the jargon, laid out the competing 
philosophical positions, provided citations to the specialist literature, and attempt- 
ed a summary evaluation of the various positions. So far, so good-but also, so 
boring. Then I came upon a dissertation formatted like a theatrical script. There 
were four characters: Winnie-the-Pooh, Piglet, Rabbit, and Christopher Robin. 
The characters chatted to each other in plain language and simple sentences, 
mentioning various homely topics-honey-pots, and the like. In fact, without this 
being explicitly stated, they were discussing the nature of representation, each 
one putting forward a coherent philosophical position and defending it against the 
objections of the others. And, amazingly, the positions “fitted” the different 
personalities of these familiar fictional friends (Pooh, for instance, was the bluff 
commonsense realist, Rabbit the devotee of formalism). Naturally, the author got 
a First. But more relevant here are the mechanisms of indexing, access, 
comparison, and control involved in noting-and constructively developing-the 
analogy between A.A. Milne’s nursery-world and a convoluted philosophical 
controversy. 
Ram’s insistence that case-based reasoning normally involves multiple processes 
interacting is well-taken. However, I suspect that this AI-work is more useful in 
theory than in practice. In other words, Ram’s work can help us to understand the 
sort of psychological processes going on in my student’s mind when he wrote his 
dissertation. Some future case-based reasoner might even be able to mimic this 
particular example, if the relevant conceptual dimensions were specifically 
provided by the programmers, (As Haase points out, current “creative” pro- 
grams, such as BACON, normally have the creative insight implicitly coded in the 
initial formulation of the problem.) But whether an AI-program could generate 
such creative comparisons spontaneously is another matter, about which I am 
highly sceptical. The knowledge-base involved is just too great, and too diverse. 
This is not to say that Ram and other AI-researchers are wasting their time. As 
I noted in Chapters 9 and 11, science aims for understanding, not-or not 
necessarily-for prediction, or even for detailed post hoc explanation. If the 
processes of conceptual comparison and control implemented in AI-programs 
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help us to see, in general terms, how human performance is possible, that is a 
considerable advance. This is especially true of areas such as creativity, where 
many people assume that no scientific account can ever be given. 
The same caveat applies to Schank’s work on explanation patterns (another 
form of case-based reasoning). He mentions some helpful general heuristics for 
adapting familiar patterns to less familiar cases. But it’s not clear to me how these 
heuristics might link Pooh and Piglet to distinct theories of representation. He 
admits as much himself, in saying that we are not seeking to reverse-engineer 
actual cases, but merely looking for AI-models that could account for creativity in 
principle. 
I am uneasy at Schank’s claim that probably 90% of P-creativity is the creative 
explanation of ill-understood or anomalous phenomena in one’s world. It was to 
remind readers of the very wide range of (explanatory and non-explanatory) 
human creativity that I deliberately referred in TCM to a host of dissimilar 
examples: music, poetry. novels, needlework, painting, choreography, sarcasm, 
car-mechanics, even advertising. Schank’s approach is well-suited to the explanat- 
ory cases, but not to the others. 
I am uneasy, too, at Schank’s account of my discussion of connectionism in 
Chapter 6. Associative creativity is, in my terms, combinational creativity. It is 
thus different from the exploration and transformation of structured conceptual 
spaces, and even from analogizing which relies on the comparison of conceptual 
structures. 
I do not claim that it cannot be modelled by symbolic systems, nor that such 
systems cannot model unconscious processes (natural-language processors, 
Schank’s included, do that constantly). But I do think that associative creativity- 
such as we see in the examples selected from “The Ancient Mariner” discussed in 
Chapter 64s more naturally modelled in connectionist terms. That is, I am not 
appealing to connectionism “as a general-purpose net to catch thoughts and ideas 
that apparently fall through the cracks of symbolic rule-based models”, but as an 
approach whose features seem to reflect what may be going on in some-only 
some-examples we normally regard as creative. (I think it interesting that there 
is a significant resemblance between the intuitions of a poet (Coleridge) and a 
literary critic (Livingston Lowes) concerning the nature of associative memory, 
and the behavior of connectionist systems.) 
Of course, connectionism is not magic. Moreover, as Schank points out, the 
human designers of connectionist systems decide on the features or sub-features 
to be coded. In NetTALK, for example, the phonetic Wickelgren features coded 
by the input-layer provided, in effect, an analysis of the task-domain that enabled 
successful learning to take place [21]. And current connectionism is crude. I agree 
with Schank, when he says that we might benefit from implementing ideas such as 
Minsky’s (171 society in mind. 
Also, as I argue in Chapter 6. we need to understand the interplay between 
associative and structuring processes in creativity-for example, the imagery and 
the stanza-structure of “The Ancient Mariner”. In other words, we should not try 
to force all examples of creative thinking into one computational box. Schank’s 
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application of the (non-connectionist) Birnbaum-Collins [27] model to Kekule’s 
insight about benzene is helpful, but that is largely because the KekulC case was 
relatively goal-directed. I do not see how this approach would apply productively 
to the examples of Coleridge’s imagery cited in Chapter 6. In short, I agree with 
Schank’s comment that connectionism, as we know it now, is suitable for 
relatively low-level processes and pattern-recognition, but not for creative insight. 
But I wouldn’t (and others normally don’t) call Coleridge’s images “insights’‘-a 
word that suggests a much more goal-directed, problem-solving approach. 
Haase remarks that we need a better understanding of how to “liberate” our 
programs from the confines of the initial representation we gave them. This is 
perhaps the most difficult question of all. Heuristics for tweaking and transform- 
ing conceptual spaces have been implemented by a number of AI-workers, but 
the “transformations” are not fundamental, and in any event are usuahy 
prefigured in the sort of way that Haase (and Schank) complains of. There are 
two problems here: how to make (sometimes fundamental) transformations, and 
how to evaluate them, once they have been made. Arguably, fundamental 
transformations are more likely to arise with the use of genetic algorithms than 
with structure-specific heuristics. But AI-researchers will hope that the selection 
at each generation would be done by the program, not the human being. 
Moreover, even if the system is self-evaluating, we shall probably find that 
plausible-generate-and-test (as opposed to random mutation) is needed. And to 
incorporate that, we-r the GA-system itself-have to decide what counts as 
plausible. In TCM (p. 213) I point out that the ARTHUR poem quoted in 
Chapter 1 was, in effect, a skit on the use of genetic algorithms. But the human 
poet was using plausible generate-and-test: because he swapped whole phrases 
(not individual words) from line to line, all but one of the final lines were, though 
strange, potentially meaningful. 
7. AI-models as aids to creativity 
In TCM, as Ram and Schank point out, I was concerned more with how 
creativity is possible than with what guidance can make it more probable. Some 
relevant remarks were made in Chapter 10, and Seymour Papert’s LOGO-led 
stress on exploration and self-analysis was noted. But I said nothing, there, about 
how current AI-models of creativity might be used to help the human creator. I 
have recently argued that such models could provide programmed “agents” for 
creativity [4]. 
Such agents (program-parts able to function relatively independently) could 
help the human to learn the constraints involved in the relevant conceptual space, 
and also help him/her to explore that space. They could suggest and identify 
differences, of varying degrees of subtlety, between familiar ideas and novel ones. 
The evaluation would be the responsibility of the human being, as is the case for 
example in evolutionary computer graphics [23,26]. Together, human and 
17x M.A. Boden I Artificial Intelligence 79 (1995) 161-182 
machine can create novel structures that the human could not have generated 
alone, and which in some cases are valued sufficiently to be sold in art-galleries. 
Sometimes, as Perkins notes, creative solutions are hard to find because the 
way in which the problem is presented masks those solutions in specific ways. This 
is illustrated in TCM (pp. 103-104) by the two-houses-and-string example, which 
shows that-in this case-visualization tends to block the (exceedingly simple) 
arithmetical solution. But visual imagery can sometimes be very helpful, as in 
Kekule’s case (see especially Chapters 4 and 10). As Ram remarks, the rarity of 
visual representations in current AI-models of problem-solving is unfortunate. If 
we are to use AI-agents as aids to our own creativity, agents capable of building, 
exploring, and transforming visual representations will be needed. 
In recommending AI-models as ways of helping or teaching creativity, how- 
ever, we must not rely only on intuition and anecdote. As I note in TCM 
(Chapter lo), some of Papert’s confident claims about the pedagogical uses of 
LOGO have been questioned by psychologists on the basis of careful ex- 
perimentation [ 181. So Schank’s-intuitively plausible-+laim that his programs 
will enable (most or all) students to become (consistently) more creative must be 
checked by psychological experimentation. AI-workers need to cooperate with 
empirical psychologists, not seek to supplant them. (More generally, people 
wanting to understand creativity need to learn from a variety of psychological 
approaches, which though highly dissimilar may complement each other in 
significant ways [3. Introduction].) 
8. Music in TCM 
One review, by Lustig, is largely devoted to TCM’s treatment of music. Lustig’s 
review is very different in tone from the others, and much less helpful. AS a 
professional musicologist, he is understandably irritated by my self-declared 
musical amateurism. His irritation, however, has led him into a less than careful, 
and very much less than generous, reading of my book-and also into an 
ill-tempered attack on a researcher whom I praised. There are many points at 
which he fails to take proper account of the spirit, and even of the letter, of my 
text. In addition, he ignores the rhetorical constraints involved in writing for a 
general audience. 
His remarks on the history of Romanticism, for example, are irrelevant. It is 
precisely because I know this history is diverse and complex that I was careful to 
say of the two popular attitudes, not “They are called the inspirational and the 
Romantic”, but rather “I call them the inspirational and the romantic” (p. 4). My 
use of the lower-case “r” was deliberate. So too was my decision not to refer to 
the disputes between individual Romantics, who therefore “are never named in 
the book”. I was concerned with today’s widely popular view that creativity is a 
gift restricted to an elite. Although this view has roots in the Romantic movement 
(which is why I used the word), it would have been inappropriate to offer a 
lengthy historical disquisition on Romanticism. 
M.A. Boden I Artifkial Intelligence 79 (1995) 161-182 179 
It would have been inappropriate also to pepper the text, here and elsewhere, 
with scholarly references. I chose to keep references to a minimum because I was 
writing for the general public, for whom the paraphernalia of footnotes and 
references might be off-putting. Since I took pains to mention as wide a range of 
examples as possible, the “complete” endnotes that Lustig demands would have 
filled many pages. Perhaps Lustig believes such rhetorical constraints should not 
be accepted, that professional academics hould write only scholarly tomes for the 
delectation of other professional academics. If so, I profoundly disagree. Ideas 
that are potentially of interest to the general public should be communicated to 
them, not kept within the ivory tower of academia. 
Lustig’s lack of attention to the rhetorical demands I faced also underlies his 
charge that I am “determined to plead Mozart’s case at any cost”. I am not. I 
deliberately referred to Mozart (as also to Kekult) in almost every chapter, in 
order to remind the reader that there are many different sorts of questions to be 
asked about any individual H-creator. For this purpose, any well-known com- 
poser (or scientist) would have done. I chose Mozart for five reasons, which 
concern the rhetorical structure of my book rather than the specifics of his music. 
In my experience, Mozart is the composer most commonly mentioned in 
discussions (written or verbal) of creativity in general, so is likely to cross the 
reader’s mind anyway. Second, the interpretation of “Amadeus” mentioned in 
Chapter 1 explicitly glossed Mozart’s creativity in “inspirational” terms, which 
was useful for my argument. Third, Mozart is someone whose work has been very 
differently valued at different times, which supports my remarks (in Chapters 3 
and 10) about the social construction of H-creativity. Fourth, he was a child 
prodigy, which is relevant to various questions about nature and nurture raised in 
Chapter 10. And fifth, an oft-cited “letter” purporting to be in Mozart’s hand is 
probably a forgery, which enabled me to show (in Chapter 10) how people who 
do plead his case may muddy the waters in respect of the nature of creativity. (I 
forebore then, and I forebear now, to name two recent books+ne of which has 
received enormous attention-that have taken this “letter” on trust: I have no 
wish to point out other writers’ mistakes just to make them look foolish.) 
As for the comparison between Mozart and Haydn on page 253, Lustig’s 
criticism again betrays careless reading. As his own quotation shows, I explicitly 
flagged the fact that this was not my own judgment (“I have heard some 
musicians say . . . “), and I took care also neither to endorse nor to deny it, since I 
am not competent to do so. This purpose of this passage was to make the point 
that such a comparison (whether justified or not for this specific pair of 
composers) is intelligible: in other words, that much of what we call “creative”, 
and admire greatly, is-in my terminology-exploration rather than transforma- 
tion. I have acknowledged (in Section 1, above) that I should have made this 
general point clearer earlier on in the book. But pouring scorn on my lack of 
musical expertise about Mozart is inappropriate, since I took care not to claim 
any. 
Since I make no claim to musical expertise, I cannot comment on most of 
Lustig’s (almost equally scornful) criticisms of Longuet-Higgins. I suspect, 
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however, that Lustig is forgetting that Longuet-Higgins’ aim is to offer a 
psychologically plausible analysis of harmony. Longuet-Higgins is well aware of 
the received theory of tonality, in which fifths (and octaves) can identify all the 
intervals. But this is a purely analytic identification. Interpreted psychologically, 
this analysis would mean that in order to recognize a major third (which he says is 
essential in understanding certain passages), one would have to go up by a fifth 
four times, and then down two octaves. He therefore adds major thirds as a 
dimension of his (psychological) harmonic space. 
As I point out in TCM, Longuet-Higgins’ work on Bach is not intended as a 
theory of musical creativity, but of musical perception. In my terms, it counts as 
“mapping” a representational space. Lustig implies that, as such, it is irrelevant to 
creativity: “What are we to do with this particular map? . . . How will we arrange 
it to be musically creative?“. But this is to ignore the exploration of a (non- 
transformed) musical space. For the purposes of computer modelling, someone 
has to define the space before anyone can explore or transform it. Longuet- 
Higgins’ work has been used (for example) as the basis of a model of jazz 
improvisation described in TCM [ 11,12]. 
The charge that Longuet-Higgins’ reference to first principles is “bluster” is 
mistaken, as is the charge that I “blithely accept and repeat” it. Lustig assumes, 
with his usual lack of generosity, that my statement hat Longuet-Higgins based 
his representation of harmonic space on “first principles” was based merely on my 
noticing his use of that phrase in the final sentence of the relevant paper. On the 
contrary, my statement was grounded also on my familiarity with Longuet- 
Higgins’ writings on a wide range of psychological topics, and on various 
unpublished lectures and informal conversations over many years. His belief that 
psychological theory-whether concerned with music, language, vision, or any- 
thing else-should start with what David Marr [28] called a “computational” 
analysis of the abstract structure of the task is made explicit in several of his 
papers [16]. His description of his work on harmony is thus entirely consistent 
with the rest of his psychological work (which is scrupulously free of bluster). 
One last example: Lustig complains that it is absurd to suggest hat Bach knew 
of the musical rules extracted from his music by Longuet-Higgins, or that he 
thought about them when composing his fugues. But whoever claimed that he 
did? Not I, and certainly not Longuet-Higgins. What Longuet-Higgins was trying 
to do was to identify certain musical structures characteristic of (some of) Bach’s 
music, and to define procedures whereby these structures could be perceived by a 
listener. Just as we are not (usually) consciously aware of following rules when we 
understand language, so we are not (usually) conscious of following musical rules. 
Many aspects of linguistic-and musical-generation and understanding lie 
beyond conscious access. One could, of course, raise questions about whether the 
procedures and symbolic representations defined by Longuet-Higgins are plaus- 
ible models of what actually goes on in the (conscious or unconscious) mind. 
Indeed, Longuet-Higgins himself does so (as I point out on page 92 of TCM), in 
saying that parallel-processing is involved in human perception, though not in his 
program. But Lustig does not appear to be asking that question. 
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My disappointment at Lustig’s review lies in the lost opportunity for construc- 
tive discussion and development of the musical examples I presented. I would 
have been very interested to know what a musicologist might say about various 
detailed aspects of Longuet-Higgins’ work on fugue (discussed in Chapter 5), or 
Johnson-Laird’s on jazz (Chapter 6). A refusal to address these issues, whether 
because of an unargued scepticism about computational approaches or because of 
the musical amateurism of the author reporting them, is unhelpful. 
9. Conclusion 
Ram and colleagues have offered an excellent summary of our problem. They 
say that the main interrelated pieces of the creativity puzzle are: inference and the 
control of inference, knowledge representation, and representational change. I 
agree. And Perkins has offered a pertinent reminder, and warning: the Gordian 
knot of creativity is a nest of knots within knots. 
Some of these knots have already been loosened by AI-ideas, and may one day 
be untied by work in AI. Others must be tackled by philosophical analysis, 
historical research, or psychological experimentation. The set of four Lovelace 
questions is a conceptual knife designed to cut the Gordian knot of computer- 
creativity into four stands, to be unravelled in different ways. AI-researchers need 
to cooperate with colleagues in psychology, philosophy, history of art and science, 
and even musicology, if they are to find their way within this nest of knots. 
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